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Paul Nitze, a long-time United States (US) arms control expert, has publicly advocated for the US to
unilaterally "get rid of" its nuclear weapons. His advocacy has strong psychological support.
Are nuclear weapons necessary to support the deterrence of a nuclear attack by other countries? Not if
other means are available. One such means is the heterogeneous combination of accurate and lethal
conventional weapons maintained by the US. These weapons can deliver variations of so-called
unacceptable damage--assuming the threat of unacceptable damage is a deterrent. It may not be, but
the same problem would then be associated with nuclear weapons.
Are nuclear weapons necessary to support the deterrence of non-state actors? Many experts believe
that such weapons have no deterrent value against such actors. If nuclear weapons do have deterrent
value, the case must still be made that this value is any different from that afforded by the conventional
arsenal mentioned above.
Are nuclear weapons necessary to destroy the nuclear weapons assets or any threat-related assets of
some adversary? No: the US conventional arsenal is more than sufficient. Both are somewhat
problematic in the absence of good intelligence collection and analysis.
Experts who argue that nuclear weapons do possess some surplus deterrent or destructive value for the
security of the US have employed two rationales. The first is that giving up any military asset ineluctably
results in a lessened resolve (to advance and protect security interests) and increased strategic
weakness (through a lesser quantity of the asset that is given up.) This rationale ignores that the
resources freed from ridding the US of nuclear weapons could still be applied to strengthening the
country--militarily, economically, socially, and culturally. And resolve can then be maintained and even
increased.
The second rationale is that even if some objective estimate of decreased resolve and increased
weakness is not at Issue, there may be such an appearance. As far as perception is reality, the subjective
can even induce the objective. To counter this rationale, one might note that holding oneself hostage to
the perceptions of others quickly becomes a never-ending quest to meet what cannot be met. This may
involve an ever-increasing attempt to meet an ever-increasing perception of decreased resolve and
increased weakness. It may even involve the converse which ironically could precipitate an objective
decrease in resolve and increase in weakness! Perhaps the only thing certain would be a strategic clinical
psychosis.
A psychological analysis can support the notion that unilateral disarmament can support US security.
Such disarmament by no means must be a pipe dream based on some pacific distortion of human
motives but can be part of a hard headed calculus of strategic superiority. (Chibnall. J.T., & Wiener, R.L.
(1988). Disarmament decisions as social dilemmas. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 18, 867-879;
Cioffi-Revilla, C. (1983). A probability model of credibility: Analyzing strategic nuclear deterrence
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systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27, 73-108; Nitze, P. (October 28, 1999). A threat mostly to
ourselves. The New York Times, p. A25; Smoke, R. (1984). The "peace" of deterrence and the "peace" of
the antinuclear war movement. Political Psychology, 5, 741-748; Tetlock, P.E. (1991). Psychological
perspectives on nuclear deterrence. Annual Review of Psychology, 42, 239-276.) (Keywords: Deterrence,
Disarmament, Nuclear Weapons, Security.)
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